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 1
"I went to the gyno when I was scared I was pregnant. We discussed protection 
and how I can stay safe from sexual no-nos," says Jocelyn, 15, of Houghton, MI. 
i've been going to planned parenthood since i became sexually active. how long 
ago that was is irrelevant! jokes aside, PP has been kind of like my makeshift 
parent. i never got "the talk," so i really have to give it up to them for schooling 
me in the ways of being a healthy, responsible and informed individual in 
my...umm...activities.1  Trish G. Los Angeles, CA. 
 
 For many young women, the first trip to Planned Parenthood, a Title X 
clinic, or a gynecologist is an important rite of passage.  Some go with a parent.  
Some go because they think they might have sex.  Many go for the first time 
because they think they are already pregnant.  Others go because they are 
married and not ready for children – or for more than already have.     
Contraception is an issue where the law can matter.  Feminist advocacy 
for reproductive rights nicely shows, in the words of the conference, how 
feminist legal theory is changing, and has changed, the law.  Yet, we’re not 
done: women’s reproductive rights remain under attack.  We want to use this to 
explore one complex aspect of feminist legal theory: one core strength of much 
of feminist legal theory is an emphasis on contextual legal reasoning and 
attention to relationships, while another strength is the feminist challenge to 
rethink existing frameworks.  The two may collide when feminists engage with 
contraceptive opponents, who seek to define the debate.  The answer here is not 
compromise, but re-framing, potentially at the expense of engagement.   For 
example, several years ago, NARAL Pro-Choice America placed an ad in the 
Weekly Standard, a conservative magazine, asking anti-choice activists to join 
with it in programs to decrease the need for abortions.2  A noble effort to form a 
coalition?  A waste of money?”[T]tactical skepticism [that] can leave people blind 
to real danger”?3 
Feminists are often good at coloring within the lines.  We build alliances, 
we work within existing frameworks, we are sensitive to nuance, we want things 
that seem reasonable and common-sensical – at least once the world 
acknowledges women’s perspectives.  Are we out of place in a polarized political 
universe?  That is, in an era where one side seizes on the very words “family 
planning” as a situs of political controversy and the other sides caves without 
protest, have our tactics been proven bankrupt?  Or is the failure simply a return 
to the norm; a norm in which women’s interests are marginalized and invisible?  
In this article, we will return to an issue associated with the modern women’s 
movement: contraception.   We will argue that this issue combines the two 
halves of feminist strategy.  To prevail requires a reframing of the existing 
                                                 
1 http://www.yelp.com/biz/planned-parenthood-costa-mesa 
2 http://www.prochoicearizona.org/news/press/200502161.shtml. 
3 http://www.therevealer.org/archives/timely_001917.php 
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political discourse and the reframing turns on once again making women’s 
issues, variety, and needs visible in the political arena.  
Access to contraception is an arena in which law plays an important role.  
Legal changes secured the initial access to the pill, whose distribution was 
initially illegal throughout most of the United States.  It won the extension of the 
right to contraception to the unmarried, a right that would have had difficulty 
passing muster in state legislatures.  Constitutional rulings further secured access 
for minors, keeping pathways to middle class status open for increasing numbers 
of teens.  Yet, these victories, which have enhanced women’s autonomy and 
material well-being, have also been deeply threatening to traditional ideologies, 
both ideologies about family and about the control of sexuality.  The alliance of 
conservative family values with conservative business interests has in turn 
created a political climate that threatens to once again marginalize women’s 
interests.4 
The legal fights over what forms of contraception are permissible, who 
has access and under what circumstances, are fundamentally about control of 
the socialization of the next generation.   The much more divisive (and seemingly 
principled) issue of abortion receives the lion’s share of publicity and anger, but 
contraception has been, and remains, a hidden casualty of the conflict.  It is also 
an issue ripe for reframing – and for making the subterranean assaults on 
women’s interests visible.  While feminist theory can be separated into various 
strands – liberal, radical, dominance, reconstructive – and various waves – first, 
second, and third -- virtually all feminists would place women’s ability to control 
our own bodies as a central tenet.  Moreover, if there is any issue that should be 
able to rally consensus support with the general public, it should be the principle 
of reducing unwanted pregnancies.  We believe that both abstinence and 
abortion are distracters in this effort; the critical issue is the availability and 
affordability of birth control.  Over 95% of sexually active Americans will use 
contraception at some point in their lives, over 90% of Americans will engage in 
non-marital sexuality, and over 60% agree that sexuality outside of marriage is 
permissible.  Moreover, unlike abortion, there is little objection to contraception 
per se, with even 75% of Catholics agreeing that the Church’s position on birth 
control should be changed.    
Yet, amidst controversies over abstinence education in public schools and 
the continuing abortion wars, the class-based nature of contraceptive access has 
become invisible.  We explore the hypocrisy of a system that, whatever its 
values, makes reproductive autonomy readily available for the affluent and the 
sophisticated and increasingly beyond the reach of the most vulnerable.  We also 
consider the potential of contraception as a reframing device, capable of 
exposing the hypocrisy of family values advocates whose policies 
disproportionately hurt the most vulnerable. This paper traces the history of 
attempts to restrict contraception, the legal events securing widespread access 
                                                 
4 See Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter With Kansas (2004) (“mixing culture war and capitalism” is writ in 
the Republican Party’s platform in Kansas).  
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to contraception and their importance to a generation of college-aged women, 
the short-lived nature of the consensus that produced them, and the potential of 
the issue to serve as a rallying point for a revitalized feminism.   
 
A. Be fruitful???? 
 
At one time, the trip in search of birth control would have been illegal.  Although 
birth control devices were legally available during much of the nineteenth 
century, they became victims of the Victorian quest for moral purity.  In 1873, 
Anthony Comstock launched a crusade against obscenity.  As a result, he was 
able to persuade Congress to pass a law that restricted using the mail service to 
circulate obscene materials, and that prohibited advertising, importing, 
transporting across state lines, or mailing contraceptives.5   The states followed 
suit, with about half passing legislation that explicitly banned the distribution or 
sale of contraception, and most of the rest passing less clearly worded laws that 
could be interpreted to do so.6  Connecticut went the furthest, prohibiting any 
use of contraception, including by married couples in the privacy of their 
bedrooms.7   
Scholars have developed numerous theories as to the origins and 
popularity of the anti-obscenity campaign.  These theories situate these 
campaigns in the context of the changing family norms of the nineteenth century 
that remade the norms of middle class life by celebrating women’s purity and 
enshrining them as the guardians who would insure that middle class boys did 
not stray from the path of enhanced education.    For some theorists, the anti-
obscenity campaigns represent a class-based attempt to return to a more 
traditional morality in the midst of a rapidly industrializing world; others see 
them as an attempt to punish women as they gained more autonomy; other 
                                                 
5 Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598; see also J.E. Leonarz, Annotation, 
Validity of Regulations as to Contraceptives or the Dissemination of Birth Control 
Information, 96 A.L.R.2d 955, § 6 (2001). 
6 For an example of such laws, see An Act Concerning Offences Against Chastity, 
Morality and Decency, 1879 Mass. Acts 512 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
272, § 21 (1992)). The Act stated:  
Except as provided in section twenty-one A, whoever sells, lends, gives away, exhibits, 
or offers to sell, lend or give away an instrument or other article intended to be used for 
self-abuse, or any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of 
conception or for causing unlawful abortion, or advertises the same, or writes, prints, or 
causes to be written or printed a card, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement or notice of 
any kind stating when, where, how, of whom or by what means such article can be 
purchased or obtained, or manufactures or makes any such article shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in jail or the house of 
correction for not more than two and one half years or by a fine of not less than one 
hundred nor more than one thousand dollars. 
7CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6399 (1878). 
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scholars place more emphasis on the  attempt to protect elite children from 
corruption.8       
 The laws lived on a long time, but, by the nineteen-fifties, court decisions 
allowed doctors to circumvent the law everywhere but in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and Mississippi.  These decisions allowed doctors to write 
prescription where the health of their patients required it, and no one policed the 
fine distinction between contraceptives for health purposes and those designed 
solely to prevent inconvenient conceptions.  A thriving black market also 
developed, for those who knew when and where to look.  The result, however, 
was a segmented industry in which the wealthy and sophisticated had relatively 
easy access to contraceptives purchased discretely from catalogues or drugstores 
while poorer people, “who either didn't have the cash for such items or even the 
knowledge that they were available,” were left out.9  Unmarried women, 
especially if they were below the age of majority (twenty-one in most states), 
were among the many denied systematic access to birth control.    
  
Moral Crisis in the Land of Ozzie and Harriet 
 
 What set the stage for the greater availability of contraceptives was the 
explosion of unplanned pregnancies in the fifties.   During the period from 1950 
to 1960, teen birthrates jumped for women aged 15 to 19 from 79.5 to 91.0 per 
thousand.10  During that same period, the adoption rate doubled, the average 
age of marriage fell to nineteen (?), the lowest level in a century, and the 
percentage of brides who gave birth within eight months of marriage grew to 
30%, figures not seen since the early 1800’s.  One of the casualties was 
women’s educational attainment; women’s degree of educational parity with men 
dropped sharply.   
 Within 20 years, however – by 1980 -- family patterns and women’s rights 
had been transformed again, – at least for the new class of baby boomers 
heading off to college.    What happened? 
 The explanation starts with an increase in the ranks of college graduates.  
Overall college attendance grew, and from 1960 to 1970, the rise in the number 
of college students “was nothing short of phenomenal, “ with enrollment more 
than doubling from 3.8 million to 8.5 million, an increase of over 100%, and 
increasing by another 42% in the seventies.11   By 1980, women constituted 
more than half of all undergraduates.  In 2003, 30.9% of the women aged 25 to 
                                                 
8 See Donna Dennis, Review Essay, 27 Law & Soc. Inq. 369, 370-375 (2002). 
9 Deborah Spar, Selling Stem Cell Science: How Markets Drive Law along the 
Technological Frontier, 33 Am. J. L. and Med. 541, 548  (2007). For a more complete history 
of these laws, see MARY WARE DENNETT, BIRTH CONTROL LAWS 7 (Da Capo Press, 
1970) (1926); Note, Some Legislative Aspects of the Birth-Control Problem, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 723, 724-26 (1932);  
10 Kristen Luker, The Politics of Teen Pregnancy, 196, tbl. 1. 
11Russell W. Rumburger, The Market for College Graduates,  1960-1990, 55 Journal of Higher Education 
433-54 (1984),  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1981442.pdf  
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29 in the United States were college graduates compared to 26% of the men.12   
With this change in pattern, a new cadre of women not only secured university 
degrees but entered the professions.  Between 1950 and 1970, the percentage 
of women in professional schools stayed flat, with no more than one percent in 
medicine (0.1), law (0.04), dentistry (0.01), and business administration (0.03).  
By 1980, however, the numbers had jumped to 30% in medicine, 36% in law, 
19% in dentistry and 28% in business.13 
 The rise in women’s educational attainment and career ambitions would 
have been difficult to reconcile with the family formation patterns of the fifties, 
and the entire set of practices changed as marriage ages increased.   Of the 
women born in 1950 and entering college in the late sixties, half were married by 
the age of twenty-three.  For those born seven years later in 1957, and entering 
college in the mid-to-late seventies, fewer than thirty percent had married by 
twenty-three, a year after the normal age of college graduation.14   Not only did 
the percentage of college graduates married by twenty-three drop by 40%, but 
those married by 26 fell from more than 70% of those born in the mid-forties 
(the college graduates of the late sixties) to approximately half of those born in 
1960.15  The increase in the ranks of unmarried young adults occurred with an 
increase in the sexual activity of younger women more generally, a dramatic 
drop in teen births, and changing expectations about fertility.    
Despite the increase in sexual activity, birth rates dropped.  Whereas the 
teen birthrate crested in 1957 at 97 births per thousand girls between the ages 
of 15 and 19, by 1983 the rates fell almost in half to 52 births per thousand 
girls.16  Adoption rates between unrelated individuals also changed markedly.  
They peaked at all time highs in 1970, but dropped in half by 1975.17  During 
this same period, expectations about fertility changed.  In 1963, 80 percent of 
non-Catholic female college students wanted three or more children, and 44 
percent wanted at least four.  By 1973, just 29 percent wanted three or more 
(and the group had less than even those lower numbers) – extraordinary shift in 
a ten period.18    
                                                 
12 http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-550.pdf 
13 Id. at 749.  
14 Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and 
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, [Journal of Political Economy, 2002, vol. 110, no. 4], p. 
731 (2002). 
15 Id. at 751. 
16 Coontz, at 202-203.  See also LUKER, supra note , at 196 tbl.1 (showing that teenage 
birthrates were 79.5 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1950, 91.0 births per 
thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1960, 73.3 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 
in 1965, 69.7 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1970, and 59.9 births per 
thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1990). 
17 Maza, P. Adoption trends: 1944-1975. Child Welfare Research Notes #9. Washington, DC: Administration 
for Children, Youth, and Families, 1984. 
18 Goldin and Katz, supra, at 752. 
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 The traditional emphasis on sexuality only within marriage, early marriage 
containing the sexual urges of the young, and the shot gun wedding or adoption 
as the fall back holding the line on unsanctioned pregnancy was giving way, and 
giving way dramatically for the most advantaged part of the population.  To 
explain so far-reaching a transformation within so short a period requires 
exploration of the social and legal changes that introduced “the pill” into 
American life. 
 
The Birth Control Pill, the Law, and the Remaking of Women’s Lives 
 
 Research on the possibility of a birth control pill may have begun as early 
as 1921, but legal restrictions on development discouraged the effort until the 
fifties.  Then, Katherine Dexter McCormick, heir to Stanley McCormick of the 
International Harvester Company fortune, funded private research on the use of 
progesterone to prevent ovulation.19  McCormick was a feminist who worked with 
Carrie Chapman Catt on ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, and then 
worked with Margaret Sanger on birth control issues.  Indeed, it was through 
Sanger that McCormick met one of them men who helped developed the birth 
control,   
The clinical trials for the Pill were conducted in Puerto Rico20 and Haiti, 
which unlike most American states, had no laws interfering with the tests. The 
Food and Drug Administration approved the first commercial birth control pill in 
1957 as a treatment for “gynecological disorders,” and in 1959 as a 
contraceptive.21   By the time the manufacturer Searle secured the 1959 
approval, 500,000 women were already using the pill as a contraceptive.  Those 
numbers increased to a million by 1961, 1.75 million in 1963, and 10 million in 
1973.  More than 80% of American women born after 1945 have been on the pill 
at some point in their lives.22   
 Legal changes – brought about through a series of test cases engineered 
by birth control activists and lawyers -- facilitated the pill’s greater availability.  
The landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut brought the issue to public 
attention in 1965.23  Connecticut had the strictest birth control law in the 
country, an act passed in the nineteenth century that banned the use of 
contraceptives, even by married couples.  The courts had rejected early efforts 
to test the legality of the statute, concluding in 1961 that doctors did not have 
standing the challenge the law.24  Estelle Griswold, the executive director of 
Planned Parenthood in Connecticut, and Dr. Charles Buxton, the chief of 
                                                 
19 LORETTA MCLAUGHLIN, THE PILL, JOHN ROCK, AND THE CHURCH 106, 115-16 (1982) 
20   See Briggs, Laura (2002). Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex Science, and U.S. 
Imperialism in Puerto Rico. University Of California Press 
21 Id. at 135. 
22 Spar, at 551. 
23 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
24 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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obstetrics and gynecology at Yale University’s School of Medicine, sought to force 
the issue by opening a birth control clinic in New Haven.  Three days after the 
clinic opened, local detectives raided the operation.  The clinic did not attempt to 
conceal its provision of contraceptives; indeed, Harold Berg, one of the New 
Haven detectives, told the New York Times, “They gave us everything we were 
looking for.”25  The trial court convicted them, and the appeal went to the United 
States Supreme Court, with Thomas Emerson of the Yale Law School faculty 
arguing the case.  In a seven-to-two decision, the Court found the statute to be 
unconstitutional.  The most controversial aspect of the decision was not the 
invalidation of the law, which many viewed as archaic and which was rarely 
enforced, but the recognition of a right to privacy grounded in the “penumbra” of 
other constitutional guarantees. 
 The Supreme Court extended the decision to single individuals in 1972.  
The decision in Griswold had guaranteed only married couples access to 
contraception.  Indeed, Planned Parenthood, which had helped bring the 1965 
case, indicated in 1967 that: "Medical consultation and services may be provided 
to minors who are married or engaged or have been pregnant or are 
accompanied by a parent or guardian or are referred by a recognized social or 
health agency, a doctor or a clergyman . . ."26  While broader than the law 
allowed in many states, it was too conservative for Bill Baird, an activist who 
wished to ensure access to everyone, and particularly to poorer and less 
privileged women.  Massachusetts had one of the most conservative remaining 
laws on birth control, which the legislature had refused to change, punishing 
unlawful dissemination as a felony with up to a five year prison sentence.  In an 
effort to test the law, Baird gave an unmarried, nineteen-year-old a condom 
during a speech on the Boston University campus in front of several thousand 
people and was arrested.27  The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding 
that: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.” 28  In 1972, however, the age of majority was still 21 in many states, so 
even a right to contraception for single adults did not necessarily extend to the 
growing ranks of college students.  Five years after Baird won the right to 
distribute contraceptives to the unmarried, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the same rights extended to minors.  The Court explained that: “Read in light of 
                                                 
25 Mary L. Dudziak, Catherine Roraback, attorney in Griswold v. Connecticut, had died,  Legal History 
Blog, October 20, 2007, http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2007/10/catherine-roraback-attorney-in-
griswold.html 
26Bill Baird, THE POLITICS OF GOD, GOVERNMENT, AND SEX: A THIRTY-ONE-YEAR 
CRUSADE, 13 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 139, 144 (1993). 
27Vice Squad Nabs BU Birth Control Speaker, Rec. Am., Apr. 7, 1967, at 2 $  
28 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
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its progeny [Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade], the teaching of Griswold is that the 
Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from 
unjustified intrusion by the State.”29  The Court observed that an unwanted 
pregnancy should not be imposed as the punishment for improvident sexual 
activity.  The Supreme Court thus swept away the remaining barriers to the 
widespread dissemination of contraception. 
 The effective availability of contraception, however, changed at different 
times in different parts of the country.  Some states began to relax their birth 
control laws after the Griswold decision in 1965.  Still, most states limited 
distribution to minors without parental consent until the Carey case in 1977.  In 
between, however, with ratification of the 26th Amendment in 1971, the Vietnam 
era amendment that lowered the voting age to 18, the vast majority of states 
changed the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen as well.  Although the 
legislatures that lowered the age of adulthood rarely considered the potential 
effect on the ability to get contraception, the legal changes had the effect of 
increasing access to the pill for students of college age.  These changes also 
made it possible for universities to offer comprehensive family planning 
assistance.  Only 12 institutions of higher learning, for example, would prescribe 
the pill to unmarried students in 1966; yet, by 1973, 42% of university students 
would have had access to such services.   
 Economists Goldin and Katz have attempted to use the uneven pace of 
these changes to test the effect of the law on birth control use, and the changing 
attitudes toward women’s career, marriage, and fertility plans.  They observe 
that the earliest states to provide minors access to birth control without parental 
consent were a seemingly random group: California and Georgia in 1988, 
Mississippi in 1968, Arkansas in 1970, Colorado, D.C., Illinois, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee in 1971.  Controlling for other 
factors, they indicate that the timing of state liberalization of access to 
contraception had a small, but statistically significant effect in decreasing the 
likelihood that a college graduate would marry before the age of twenty-three.30  
Abortion, of course, complemented and enhanced the effect of contraception, 
and the economists found further that the legalization of abortion also 
contributed to the drop in the ranks of college graduates who married at earlier 
ages.  They then used statistical techniques to attempt to separate the effects of 
abortion from those caused by greater access to birth control and concluded that 
legalization of access to birth control for minors had “a substantial and significant 
effect” while the effect of abortion rates became “small and insignificant” once 
they teased apart the combined effects.31  Goldin and Katz conclude that legal 
                                                 
29 Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977). 
30 Goldin and Katz, 755. 
31 Id. at 755.  In this study, the authors first introduce the average abortion rate in an individual’s state of 
birth when the individual was 18-21.  Inclusion of this variable shows a large negative and statistically 
significant impact of the state abortion variable on the likelihood a female college graduate will marry by 
23.   The authors then add state of birth linear time trends, which reduces the size and significance of the 
abortion rate variable, and increases that of access to birth control. 
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changes in the access minors had to the pill in a given state generated “24-27% 
percent” of the large decline in the number of college graduates married by age 
23.32  While the economists recognize that many minors obtained the pill even in 
the states that restricted access, legalization appears to have played a 
substantial role in the dramatic changes in family practices.   
  The emergence of what we have called elsewhere the blue family 
paradigm – delayed marriage and childbearing, greater investment in women’s 
careers, more egalitarian gender relationships – came with the advent of the 
birth control pill and the widespread availability of contraception for anyone who 
wanted it.33  Goldin and Katz emphasize that oral contraceptives had a far wider 
impact than abortion, especially for the college educated.34  Part of the 
explanation is simple convenience: “a virtually foolproof, easy-to-use, and 
female-controlled contraceptive having low health risks, little pain, and few 
annoyances” made possible widespread adoption and a wholesale change in the 
marriage norms of the newly expanded class of college graduates possible.  
Abortion almost certainly contributed as well, with contraception allowing a 
wholesale shift in attitudes toward the permissibility of non-marital sexuality, and 
abortion providing a form of insurance when contraception failed. 
The increase in the age of marriage that followed also produced a cascade 
of other changes.  Women who came of age away from their parents and 
enjoyed a substantial period of independence before starting families 
experienced a measure of autonomy impossible in earlier eras.  They would 
expect substantially more from their mates and the world around them.  Modern 
feminism emerged with confidence and visibility. 
 
Contraception for the Masses 
 
The advent of birth control did more, of course, than simply enhance the 
careers and marriage prospects of college educated women.  It changed the 
norms and attitudes of society as a whole toward sexual activity – and toward 
women’s autonomy.  The figures we cited earlier that indicate that the percent of 
the population having sex by the age of 21 rose from 40% to 70% were for the 
entire population.  Today, 77% of men and women will have had sex, including 
75% who will have had premarital sex, by the age of 20.  By the age of 44, 95% 
of the entire population will have had sex outside of marriage, and they will 
overwhelmingly have done so with someone other than a person they will 
eventually marry.35  Public attitudes toward non-marital sexuality have shifted 
with the change in practices; sixty-one percent of adults aged 18 to 29 approve 
                                                 
32 Id. at 758. 
33 Red Families v. Blue Families, forthcoming Oxford University Press. 
34 Id. at 764.  They note that, among non-virgins, the fraction of women who have taken the pill is eight 
times the number who have had an abortion. 
35 Public Health Reports, http://www.webmd.com/sex-relationships/news/20061220/premarital-sex-the-
norm-in-america 
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of premarital sex today compared with 21 percent of the same group in a Gallup 
poll in 1969.36 
Acceptance of non-marital sexuality also meant, at least for a brief period, 
a willingness to consider its consequences.  Political proposals for greater family 
planning assistance date back decades.  In the fifties, however, President 
Eisenhower dismissed them, observing that he could not “imagine anything more 
emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity or 
function or responsibility. . . . This government will not, as long as I am here, 
have a positive political doctrine in its program that has to do with this problem 
of birth control. That is not our business.”37  By the mid-sixties, however, the 
discourse on contraception more generally came together with greater concern 
about poverty, and a racialized discourse about fertility. 
Perhaps the most influential study of fertility in the sixties indicated that 
while poor women had dramatically higher fertility rates than the affluent (one 
report compared the birth rates of the Chicago urban poor to those in India), 
poor women and minority women actually wanted fewer children than the 
affluent, and twice as many of the children born to the poor were unwanted in 
comparison with the children born to better off mothers.  The study found, for 
example, that 17 percent of whites and 31 percent of blacks had not wanted the 
last child born to them.   For those women who had not completed high school, 
the figures were even higher, with 31 percent of whites and 43 percent of blacks 
stating that their last child had not been wanted.38  The two tiered system 
produced by the Comstock laws, in which the sophisticated secured effective 
birth control, where the less advantaged did not, had a palpable effect on fertility 
rates.   
The discussion of fertility came as President Johnson was launching a war 
on poverty, and as the Supreme Court was eliminating the last vestiges of the 
moral regulations that excluded poor women from welfare eligibility.  When 
Congress authorized the aid to dependent children program in the thirties, it 
designed the program primarily for widows, and allowed the states to bar non-
marital children from benefits.  By the sixties, the federal agency charged with 
oversight of the program had eliminated most of the formal prohibitions, but it 
continued to deem the income of males present in the home available to the 
family.  To check up on the presence of such unreported cohabitants, welfare 
authorities conducted midnight visits, dubbed “Operation Bedcheck” to determine 
continued eligibility.  In 1968, the Supreme Court ruled that such practices were 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  It explained that “Congress has 
determined that immorality and illegitimacy should be dealt with through 
rehabilitative measures rather than measures that punish dependent children.”  
The Court found it “simply inconceivable” that any state would be free “to 
                                                 
36 abcnews.go.com/primetime/pollvault/Story?id=156921&page=2 - 
37 THOMAS C. DIENES, LAW, POLITICS, AND BIRTH CONTROL 266 (1972)). 
38 Luker, Dubious Conceptions, 56-57. 
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discourage immorality and illegitimacy by the device of absolute disqualification 
of needy children.”39 
As a result of active outreach as part of the war on poverty and the 
relaxation of the restrictions, welfare ranks swelled.   In the early to mid-sixties, 
only half of those who were eligible received welfare benefits.40  By 1976, 
however, the number of families participating in the welfare program increased 
from less than a million in 1964 to 3.5 million, more than tripling the size of the 
program.41  Moreover, while the majority of welfare recipients have always been 
white, African-Americans are dramatically more likely than whites to be poor.  
The percentage of African-American beneficiaries increased steadily through the 
sixties and early seventies, peaking in 1976, with blacks at 46% of the caseload, 
even though they constituted only 11% of the population.42  During the same 
period, concern grew about the changing composition of the African-American 
family, with non-marital births growing from 25% of the total in 1965 (the time 
of the Moynihan report, which touched off a political firestorm by calling 
attention to the high numbers) to 60% by 1975. 43 
In this context, calls for increased access to family planning services won 
bi-partisan support.  Kristin Luker reports that: “When poor women were having 
unwanted, out-of-wedlock births in such large numbers (out-of-wedlock births 
were assumed to be unwanted births), and when unwanted babies seemed to 
swelling the AFDC roles, an archaic birth control policy that kept contraceptives 
out of the hands of the poor seemed ludicrous, if not tragic.”44  It probably did 
not hurt politically that the Supreme Court’s birth control decision in Griswold had 
drawn little protest, and that the major skeptics of the new proposals were black 
nationalists who saw the emphasis on birth control for poor black women as a 
form of genocide.  
In 1966 --  6 (?) years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisenstadt 
extending the right to contraception to single women and __ years before the 
Court’s decision providing access to adolescents --  a bipartisan congressional 
committee recommended that publicly funded birth control be made available to 
any AFDC recipient over the age of 15, regardless of whether she was married.  
Congress also made contraception a special emphasis of the war on poverty, 
appropriating specific funds for family planning efforts.  In 1970, Congress 
passed and President Richard Nixon signed Title X of the Public Health Services 
Act, which created "a comprehensive federal program devoted entirely to the 
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provision of family planning services on a national basis."  The vote was 
unanimous in the Senate and overwhelming in the House (298-32).45  Two years 
later, at the insistence of the Nixon Administration, Congress amended the 
Medicaid statute to add family planning to the list of "mandated services" that 
health care providers must provide in order to remain eligible for federal 
Medicaid funds.   Even more remarkably, by the late seventies, Congress agreed 
that adolescent sexuality was an important concern and, in 1978, in the year 
following the Supreme Court’s insistence that teen access to contraception could 
not be conditioned on parental consent, Congress amended Title X to make it 
clear that recipients of Title X family planning funds were required to provide 
services to adolescents.46  Family planning had become central to Democratic 
and Republican anti-poverty efforts, and been transformed in the words of one 
historian from “private vice to public virtue.”47 
   
Gender Equality – temporarily Triumphant 
 
The emergence of what we are today calling the blue family paradigm 
was neither partisan nor ideological, though parts of it were certainly 
controversial.  It reflected the convergence of the interests of a favored group – 
middle class college students – with concerns about the “excess fertility” of a 
disfavored group – the urban poor.  Moreover, the most practical assertion of the 
new paradigm – support for contraception – was intensely pragmatic.  Middle 
class women, whether married or single, had embraced the pill in overwhelming 
numbers, and opposition was politically perilous.  At the same time, making the 
same means available for poorer women simply made sense, whether the 
support was motivated by concern for reproductive autonomy or for reducing the 
numbers of a group viewed as a drain on societal resources. 
At the center of these developments, however, were important principles 
that allowed a reformulation of family practices.  Critical among them was the 
idea that childbirth should be chosen, rather than an inevitable or punitive 
consequence of sexual activity.   This idea commanded overwhelmingly support 
both in the congressional votes for family planning, and in the Supreme Court 
cases that extended the right to privacy to single individuals and teens.  The idea 
was both substantive (at its core is a commitment to reproductive autonomy), 
and pragmatic (the alternatives were proven failures as the numbers of 
unwanted pregnancies attested).   It was also an essential component in 
women’s greater autonomy. 
The Court in both Eisenstadt and Carey v. Population Services, the case 
that invalidated the New York law restricting distribution of contraceptives to 
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minors, further rejected the asserted state interest in pregnancy as a deterrent 
to sexual activity as a legitimate basis of state regulation.  In Carey, the state 
had argued that the availability of birth control would “lead to increased sexual 
activity among the young.”48  Yet, the Court dismissed the suggestion that it is 
appropriate to deter sexual activity by “increasing the hazards attendant on it,” 
observing that “no court or commentator has taken the argument seriously.”  
The reason, which the Eisenstadt Court had also recognized, was that: “It would 
be plainly unreasonable to assume that the [the State] has prescribed pregnancy 
and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication.  We remain 
reluctant to attribute any such “scheme of values” to the State.”49  With that 
declaration, the shot gun marriage as official state policy was at an end – at least 
until the next decade brought it back.   
Red Backlash and the New War on Contraception 
 
 The bipartisan support for contraception did not last.  What changed, 
according to law professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel, is the identification 
of the abortion issue with feminism and the perceived threat to traditional 
family values.  They observe that by the end of the seventies, conservatives 
mobilized against abortion in order to protect traditional family roles.50  The 
Christian Harvest Times in 1980, for example, denounced abortion as part of 
a parade of secular evils.  In its "Special Report on Secular Humanism vs. 
Christianity," it explained that  "To understand humanism is to understand 
women's liberation, the ERA, gay rights, children's rights, abortion, sex 
education, the 'new' morality, evolution, values clarification, situational 
ethics, the loss of patriotism, and many of the other problems that are 
tearing America apart today."51   Reagan ran for the Presidency in 1980 on a 
Republican Party Platform that pledged to "work for the appointment of 
judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and 
the sanctity of innocent human life."52    
 While as Post and Siegel illustrate, abortion served as the rallying cry, 
the attack was not just on abortion as violation of certain religious teachings, 
but on modernism itself, and on family changes as a symbol of the decay of 
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traditional values.  At each stage therefore, attacks on abortion have been 
accompanied by less heralded cutbacks on the availability of contraception. 
The Reagan Administration, for example, cut Title X funding by over a 
quarter shortly after taking office, and attempted to divert family planning 
efforts from birth control to abstinence, adoption counseling, and other 
practices more acceptable to its social conservative base. 53  In particular, the 
Administration tried to undermine Carey; the Department of Health and 
Human Services promulgated new regulations requiring Title X grantees to 
notify their parents within ten working days, and disqualified them from 
further treatment if they failed to do so.  The courts struck down the 
regulations as inconsistent with the statute.54   
While pregnancy prevention efforts received renewed attention under 
Clinton, , federal funding, adjusted for inflation, never again reached the 1980 
levels for Title X.  In the later years of the Bush administrations, the levels 
remained stalled at 61% (in inflation-adjusted dollars) of the 1980 levels.  Nor 
have the efforts to undermine adolescent access disappeared.  Utah and Texas 
passed laws that prohbit state funds from being used to support minors access 
to confidential contraceptive services.  And bills in other states, like Maine (2009) 
and Arizona (in 2006), seek to require parental consent for all prescriptions 
issued to a minor.  Moreover, a number of the states that use Medicaid funds to 
extend family planning efforts, limit their programs to women over the age of 
19.55     And the Department of Health and Human Services, in the waning days 
of the Bush Administration issued regulations allowing  for conscientious 
objection on behalf of  health professionals.   Although justified by anti-abortion 
concerns, the rules could easily be interpreted to allow pharmacists and other 
health professionals to pick and choose among the products they supply (selling 
condoms, for example, but not the “morning after pill,”) and to deny birth control 
to minors, the unmarried, or others to whom they object on ethical grounds, 
making the process of securing contraception more burdensome.56  57  Even  the 
Obama Administration, early in its term, bowed to Republican pressure and 
removed expanded funding for family planning efforts from its stimulus 
                                                 
53 G. Crum, Health care policy and the Reagan administration: the case of family planning.  
JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION. 1990 Spring;12(4):524-
35.  
 
54 Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
55 Alabama, Louisiana, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Wyoming limit the 
program to women over 19.  New Mexico, Texas and Pennsylvania offer services to those over 18.  The 
other states (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin) do not have age 
limits.  Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: State Medicaid Family Planning Eligibility 
Expansions, Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SMFPE.pdf. 
56 73 Fed. REg. 78072 *Dec. 19, 2008). 
57 National Women’s Law Center , Final HHS Rule Threatens Women’s Access to Health Care 
Information and Options,Poses Serious Risks to Women’s Health (2008). 
  15
package.58   The terrified teen, esecially one in a small town, who is otherwise be 
willing to use contracetpion, might now has to guess on top of everything else 
which pharmacists will be willing to fill a prescription or sell pubicly available 
products to her without humiliation.  Members of Congress have promised to 
introduce legislation to block implementation of the regulations, and the 
Connecticut attorney general has already filed suit to challenge the provisions, 
but they illustrate the merger of anti-abortion rhetoric with efforts to undermine 
contraceptive availability. 
 
Feminists Divided 
 
The long hard fight over abortion, which has cloaked the less visible 
attacks on contraception, threatens in the long run to also divide feminist 
interests.  In the sixties, the middle class embrace of contraception occurred 
side-by-side efforts to extend contraception to poorer women.  With women’s 
interests in reproductive autonomy on the defensive, the progress that has been 
made in recent years overwhelming secures middle class advantage.  Thus, 
among the few victories in the Bush years have been securing approval of Plan 
B, the morning after pill, and  expanding the availability of RU-486 and other 
forms of non-surgical abortion.  With the expansion of these products, however, 
middle class women’s support for surgical abortion has fallen.  Yet, poor women 
depend to a much greater degree than middle class women women on abortion 
rather than contraception, and surgical abortion, which is available later in 
pregnancy, than non-surgical abortion or the morning after pill. 59 
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In the meantime, the uneequal access to reproductive autonomy that motivated 
Congress in the seventies remains.  In 2006, half of all pregnancies in the United States 
were unplanned.  The rates varied by socioeconomic status.  Women whose income levels 
were 200% of the poverty line had a  mere 29 unplanned pregnancies per 1000 women 
aged 15-44, women whose income was 100% of the poverty line had 81 unplanned 
pregancies per thousand women in the age group, and those below the poverty line had 
112 per 1000 women, almost four times the rate of the most affluent.  The disparities 
have increased in recent years, with poor women’s unplanned pregnancy rates increasing 
by 29% while dropping for the better off.   And the unplanned pregnancies produce even 
greater disparities in unplanned births: 11 per thousand women for the most affluent 
group, 35 per thousand for those women at 100% of the poverty line, and 58 per 
thousand for those in poverty, more than five times the rate of the wealthiest group. 
Support for contraception should be mustered, therefore, as it was in the 
sixties and seventies on a consensus basis.  Instead of commanding bipartisan 
support, however, contraception often enters public discourse framed in more 
divisive terms.   
The question then is how to move away from the current impasse on 
control of fertility.  In understanding these developments and the possible 
responses to them, two particular areas deserve special consideration.  First, we 
must pay heightened attention to the political developments that have frustrated 
more effective policy responses.  Contraception simply should not be that 
controversial.  The overwhelming majority of American women use  birth control 
at some point in their lives (over 96%), the vast majority have sex before they 
marry (95%), and the majority of Americans (61%) approve of premarital sex, 
with only those over the age of sixty disagreeing.60     
Nonetheless, as the debates over welfare reform, abstinence education, 
contraception and abortion illustrate, an activist minority has succeeded in using 
the political process to undercut assistance for the most vulnerable Americans, 
and in forcing feminists to compromise.   
The results are particularly cynical.  The middle class, which has the 
political clout to defeat more radical changes, has been largely unaffected by the 
lesser support for access to birth control and abortion.61  Wholesale cutbacks and 
their disproportionate impact on low income women remain virtually invisible to 
much of the electorate.  Conservatives can accordingly satisfy their 
fundamentalist “base” without paying a political price among moderates.   
The recent decision to remove a family planning provision from the 2009 
stimulus package provides a perfect illustration.  The funds would have helped 
poor women with contraception, sexually transmitted diseases, and other health 
needs.  It was sufficiently complex, however, that it could easily be distorted – 
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and was.  Existing law already allowed states to apply for waivers from Medicaid 
income standards so that they could cover family planning services and supplies 
to low-income women not otherwise eligible for Medicaid.  27 states had already 
received these waivers. The bill would simply have given states the option to 
provide such coverage without the administrative process of obtaining a waiver.   
Republicans, however, threatened to target conservative Democrats who 
supported the bill.  Republicans claimed that the provision would “’fund the 
abortion industry,’” 62 even though the Hatch Act prevents any federal money 
from funding abortions as part of family planning services.  The US Conference 
of Catholic Bishops stated that it “strongly oppose[d] the specific sections that 
target efforts to expand coverage for family planning (and only family planning) 
for low-income and temporarily unemployed women. They neglect women's real 
needs and serve no legitimate purpose for an economic stimulus package,” and it 
charged that the provision “effectively makes family planning clinics (many of 
which are abortion providers) a necessary entry point into the health care 
system, ignoring women's genuine needs as well as their moral convictions.”63  
By contrast, the ACLU charged, “The removal of the Medicaid Family Planning 
State Option [was] fueled by the anti-choice rhetoric of certain lawmakers . . 
.Our elected officials should be fighting to improve the health of low-income 
women by increasing access to health care services, such as contraceptives. 
Family planning services are a critical part of the continuum of health care needs 
and access to these services can increase women's choices and opportunities at 
home, in the workplace and in the broader community." 64  Democrats removed 
it from the legislation.  Interestingly, the same provision has appeared before 
Congress several times under the innocuous title, “the Prevent Prematurity and 
Improve Child Health Act,” sponsored by two Democratic and two Republican 
Senators. 65  
“Family planning,” whatever its content, has become one of the more 
effective targets in a world of polarized discourse; moreover, a significant portion 
of Congress would prefer to have a political issue salient in the next campaign to 
a compromise that might allow funding on a consensus basis.  With the Obama 
Administration’s ready withdrawal of the family planning proposals, the press 
never gave much coverage to the issue, nor realistically described the 
consequences of the decision.  The words “family planning” was enough to 
ensure removal of the provisions.  The subsequent party line vote in the House 
of Representatives on the stimulus package even without the family planning 
funds provides an indication of just how difficult it will be to enact more realistic 
support for poor women’s health needs. 
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Feminists are in the process of reframing the debate.  But they must not, 
as Katha Pollitt charges, “deframe” the issue because  “There's a word that 
doesn't show up much in the new abortion frames: women. Maybe it doesn't poll 
well. "Reframing" abortion is actually a kind of deframing, a way of taking it out 
of its real-life context, which is the experience of women, their bodies, their 
healthcare, their struggles, the caring work our society expects them to do for 
free.”66   Women’s issues won in the sixties because the feminist agenda 
intersected with some other important pressure groups, including those who 
wanted to limit poor women's sexuality.  Now that we're on our own, we don't 
look out for ourselves very well. 
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